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Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a way for establishing information-theoretically secure
communications. An important part of QKD technology is a high-quality random number generator
(RNG) for quantum states preparation and for post-processing procedures. In the present work, we
consider a novel class of prepare-and-measure QKD protocols, utilizing additional pseudorandomness
in the preparation of quantum states. We study one of such protocols and analyze its security
against the intercept-resend attack. We demonstrate that, for single-photon sources, the considered
protocol gives better secret key rates than the BB84 and the asymmetric BB84 protocol. However,
the protocol strongly requires single-photon sources.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum algorithms exploit the laws of quantum me-
chanics to solve problems exponentially faster than their
best classical counterparts [1]. Shor’s quantum algorithm
for fast number factoring attracted a great attention since
this problem is in heart of public-key cryptosystems [2].
In view of the Shor’s algorithm, the only way to ensure
the absolute long-term security is to use information-
theoretically secure primitives, such as the one-time pad
scheme [3–5]. However, the need for establishing secret
keys between communicating parties invites the challenge
of how to securely distribute these keys [5].
Fortunately, together with the tool for breaking public-
key cryptographic primitives, quantum physics allows
one to establish secure communications [6–10]. By
encoding information in quantum states of photons,
transmitting them through fiber channels and commu-
nication via authenticated classical channel, QKD sys-
tems offer a practical tool for private key distribu-
tion [6–10]. Unlike classical cryptography, QKD promises
information-theoretical security based on the quantum
physics laws [9–11]. During last decades, great progress
in theory, experimental study, and technology of QKD
has been performed [12]. However, QKD technology faces
a number of challenges such as distance, key generation
rate, practical security, and many others [12].
The idea behind the seminal proposal for QKD proto-
col, known as BB84 protocol [6], is inspired by conjugate
coding [13]. The BB84 protocol employs the idea of usage
of two orthogonal polarizations states of photons. The
BB84 protocol has been widely studied [6–10], and its
security has been proven [14–19]. Development of novel
QKD protocols, offering ways to push the performance of
QKD technology, is on a forefront of quantum informa-
tion technologies. During last decades several extensions
of the BB84 protocol and alternative QKD protocols,
such as E91 [20], B92 [21], six-state BB84 protocol [22],
asymmetric BB84 (we will abbreviate it as aBB84) [23],
Figure 1. Bases patterns on the Poincare´ sphere. The BB84
protocol (left) uses two maximally conjugated bases with the
angle pi/4 between each other. For each pulse, the bases are
chosen by Alice and Bob randomly and independently, so,
the sifting procedure (discarding of positions where Alice’s
and Bob’s bases are different) is required. In the suggested
protocol (right), the standard basis {|0〉 , |1〉} is rotated by an
arbitrary angle (from a finite set) in not a random pseudo-
random manner. Thus, the bases of Alice and Bob always
coincide and there is no sifting.
SARG04 [24], differential-phase shift [25], coherent one
way [26], and also setups with continuous variables [27],
have been actively discussed.
The point we want to stress here is the fact that for the
seminal BB84 protocol and most of its variations, some-
thing should provide the ignorance of an eavesdropper
(Eve) about the bases in which quantum states are en-
coded [6]. The BB84 protocol provides this condition by
the random independent choice of the bases by legitimate
parties (Alice and Bob). To this end, Alice and Bob use
true random number generators (TRNG). However, the
cost is the sifting procedure: Alice and Bob must discard
the positions with incompatible basis choices. This leads
to a loss of approximately a half of the raw key. In order
to reduce the losses in the sifting procedure, the aBB84
protocol has been proposed [23]. In this protocol, Alice
and Bob use one basis with a high probability and a con-
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
00
61
1v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
2 J
un
 20
17
2jugate basis with a small probability. The first basis is
used mainly to establish a secret key, while the second
one is used to verify the absence of eavesdropping. We
will refer to these bases as “the signal basis” and “the
test basis”, respectively. In the asymptotic case of an in-
finitely large number of transmitted quantum states, the
probability of the use of the test basis can be made arbi-
trarily small. Hence, the basis choices of Alice and Bob
are almost always coincide and there is almost no sifting.
Nevertheless, for a finite number of transmitted states,
this probability cannot be made arbitrarily small since a
reliable statistics for the test basis should be collected for
tight estimation of the amount of eavesdropping [23, 28].
In the present work, we consider a novel class of QKD
protocols, which utilizes the pseudorandomness in the
preparation of quantum states. Namely, Alice and Bob
can use not random, but pseudorandom sequence of bases
generated from a common short secret key. On the
one hand, their bases always coincide, so, the suggested
scheme allows one to avoid the sifting procedure. On the
other hand, for Eve, who does not know this key, the se-
quence is similar to a random one and she cannot predict
it. On the basis of this idea, we study a protocol with
pseudorandom choice of bases (abbreviated as PRB) and
analyze its security against the intercept-resend attack.
The suggested protocol is a formalization of a protocol
(the floating basis protocol) described by one of the au-
thors [29–31]. In this work, we assume that the sequence
of logical bits is truly random, but the sequence of bases
is pseudorandom. We then demonstrate that the PRB
protocol gives higher secret key rates than the BB84 pro-
tocol and approximately the same rates as the asymmet-
ric BB84 protocol. However, the PRB strongly requires
single-photon sources.
A general motivation for the development of new QKD
protocols is exploration of different ways of how we can
exploit the properties of quantum information to pro-
vide information security. The novel idea of the proto-
col proposed here is a method of combining of classical
pseudorandomness with quantum encoding of informa-
tion. We should note that the known Y00 protocol [32–
34] also use pseudorandom quantum states. It provides
a randomized stream cipher with information theoretic-
security by a randomization based on quantum noise and
additional tools. Another important example of utilizing
pseudorandomness is recently suggested mechanism for
quantum data locking [35, 36].
We can treat QKD protocols utilizing pseudorandom-
ness in such a way. Since generators of true random num-
bers are not sufficiently fast, pseudorandom number gen-
erators (PRNGs) are used in practical setups instead [37].
It is interesting to study how the use of pseudorandom
numbers instead of true random numbers affects the se-
curity of QKD protocols (see Ref. [38]) and, moreover,
can it be even advantageous. Here we assume that the
sequence of logical bits is truly random, but the sequence
of bases is pseudorandom. As it was explained above, if
we are able to prove the security of such scheme, we can
made it more advantageous due to avoiding the sifting
(with the cost of an additional secret key consumption
for initial secret random seed for the PRNG in future
sessions).
The paper is organized as follows. The new QKD
protocol, which we will refer to as pseudorandom ba-
sis (PRB) protocol, is described in Sec. II. Its security
against the intercept-resend attack is proved in Sec. III.
We summarize the main results of our work in Sec. V. In
Sec. IV, we analyze the photon number splitting (PNS)
attack and show that, unlike the BB84 protocol and
its modifications, the PRB protocol strongly requires a
single-photon source of light.
II. QKD PROTOCOL WITH PSEUDORANDOM
BASES
Let Alice and Bob have a common pre-shared key
k = (k1, . . . , kl) ∈ {0, 1}l, (1)
which is the seed for the pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG), l is the key size. We use the following notation:
|ϕ〉 = cosϕ |0〉+ sinϕ |1〉 , (2)
where {|0〉 , |1〉} is the standard basis. As usual in QKD,
Alice and Bob have quantum channel and authenticated
public classical channel: Eve freely read the communica-
tion over this channel, but cannot interfere in it.
The considered class of QKD protocol based on pseu-
dorandomness operates as follows.
(i) Using the common pre-shared key k and the PRNG,
Alice and Bob generate a common pseudorandom
sequence in the following form:
ϕ1(k), . . . , ϕN (k), ϕi(k) ∈
{
pij
2M
}M−1
j=0
(3)
where M = 2m for some m ≥ 1. Schematically
such pseudorandom rotations of the standard basis
{|0〉 , |1〉} are shown on Fig. 1. We assume that l
is divisible by m and denote l/m = l′. We assume
that N = 2l
′
.
(ii) Using a TRNG, Alice generates the random bits as
follows:
x1, . . . , xN . (4)
(iii) Using sequence (3) and generated random bits (4),
Alice prepares the following sequence of states:
|ϕ1(k) + x1pi/2〉 , . . . , |ϕN (k) + xNpi/2〉 , (5)
and sends them to Bob over the quantum channel.
(iv) Bob measures them using the following bases:
{|ϕi(k)〉 , |ϕi(k) + pi/2〉}, i = 1, . . . , n. (6)
3(v) Bob then writes the results of these measurements
in the binary variables yi as follows: |ϕi(k)〉 corre-
sponds to yi = 0 and |ϕi(k) + pi/2〉 corresponds to
yi = 1. In the case of ideal channel and no eaves-
dropping, xi = yi for all i, hence, Alice and Bob
can use their binary strings x and y as a common
secret key. Due to noise in the channel and, prob-
ably, eavesdropping, there are some errors in these
strings, and Eve potentially have some information
about them. They are, thus, called the raw keys.
(vi) The following steps of post-processing of raw keys
coincide with those of BB84, so, we only briefly
mention them: Alice and Bob perform the error
correction (using error-correcting codes or interac-
tive error correction protocols; for the last issues
concerning the adaptation of error-correcting codes
for QKD see Ref. [39]) and calculate the number
of detected errors [40, 41]. If the number of errors
exceeds a certain threshold, which make the secret
key distribution impossible, Alice and Bob abort
the protocol. Otherwise, they perform privacy am-
plification to reduce the potential Eve’s information
to a negligible level. The resulting key is called the
secret key or the final key. It is the output of our
QKD protocol.
The underlying idea of the protocol is as follows. If
Eve does not know the initial secret key k, and the pseu-
dorandom angles ϕi are similar to truly random, then
she cannot guess all the bases correctly and her eaves-
dropping will cause disturbance in the Alice’s and Bob’s
raw keys. Of course, a rigorous analysis is required since
which takes into account that the sequence {ϕi(k)}Ni=1 it
not truly random but pseudorandom.
Remark 1. We note that every quantum key distillation
protocol that makes use of pre-shared key can be trans-
formed into an equally efficient protocol which needs no
pre-shared key [42]. However, this fact is irrelevant for
our case since we use the pre-shared key not on the stage
of secret key distillation from raw keys, but on the pre-
vious stage of transfer of quantum states.
Remark 2. If M = 2, then the protocol uses two BB84
bases. In this case, the protocol can be called “BB84 with
pseudorandom sequence of bases”, while the case M > 2
can be called the “multibasis protocol”. We will see that
the multibasis version gives higher secret key rates due
to additional uncertainty for Eve.
The possibility of the use of arbitrary number of bases
is a consequence of their correlated choice by Alice and
Bob; otherwise this would lead to an increase of the num-
ber of positions with inconsistent bases.
A. PRNG based on the Legendre symbol
Our choice for the PRNG is the Legendre symbol
PRNG, since it provides an almost uniform distribution
of patterns, which will be exploited in the security proof.
The PRNG is defined as follows.
Let L be a prime number (public value) such that L ≡
3 (mod 4), and k ∈ [0, L−1] be a secret key. Let us then
define
ai =

1, if i is a quadratic residue modulo L
and i 6≡ 0 (mod L);
0, otherwise,
(7)
ai(k) = ak+i. (8)
Recall that x is called a quadratic residue modulo L if
there exists an integer y such that y2 ≡ x (mod L). If
i 6≡ 0 (mod L), the value 2ai − 1 is called the Legendre
symbol of i. We will refer to the sequence
a1, a2, . . . (9)
as the Legendre sequence. It is periodic with the period
L.
Pseudorandom properties of Legendre sequences are
known for a long time [43]. In particular, the distribu-
tion of patterns of Legendre sequences is known to be
close to uniform [43–45] (for details, see property (A4)
from Appendix A and, as its direct consequence, prop-
erty (C14) from Appendix C). This will be important for
estimation of the number of bases correctly guessed by
Eve.
Let us specify the use of this PRNG for our protocol.
In the two-basis version of the protocol (BB84 with pseu-
dorandom sequence of bases), the basis for each position
i is specified by a single bit ai(k). The length of the key l
is the number of bits required to specify k, i.e., dlog2 Le.
In the following, dxe and bxc denote the ceil and the floor
of x (the closest integer to x from above and from below),
respectively.
In the multibasis version of the protocol, every basis is
specified by m bits, or m registers. Each register has its
own PRNG based on the Legendre symbol, so that
ϕi(k) =
pi
2
m∑
j=1
ai(k
(j))2−j , (10)
where k(j) is a subkey (of length l′ = dlog2 Le) for the
jth register and the sequence (a1(k
(j)), a2(k
(j)), . . .) is
specified by (8). The total key (k(1), . . . , k(m)) has the
length l = l′m
III. INTERCEPT-RESEND ATTACK
The simplest attack on BB84-like protocols is the
intercept-resend attack. Here we describe this attack for
the considered class of QKD protocols.
(i) Eve chooses some positions 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < in ≤ N
to intercept, where 0 < n ≤ N . Denote γ = n/N
the fraction of positions she intercepts. Then, for
each j = 1, . . . , n, Eve performs the next steps.
4(ii) Eve chooses an angle βij , measures the ijth qubit
in the basis {
|βij 〉 , |βij +
pi
2
〉
}
, (11)
and writes the result in the variable zij (0 or 1,
respectively).
(iii) Eve sends a new qubit in the state |βij + zijpi/2〉 to
Bob.
The crucial point is that the results of Eve’s mea-
surements alone leaks no information about the bases
and, hence, about the initial secret key (the seed for the
PRNG) k.
Indeed, denote p(k|z) the probability of the key k
conditioned on the Eve’s results of the measurements
z = (zi1 , . . . , zin). Denote
ϕ = ϕ(k) = (ϕ1(k), ϕ2(k), . . . , ϕN (k)). (12)
We then define the probability
p(k|z) = p(ϕ|z) = p(z|ϕ)p(ϕ)
p(z)
. (13)
Here
p(z|ϕ) =
n∏
j=1
p(zij |ϕij ) = 2−n (14)
since
p(z|ϕ) = p(z|ϕ, x = 0)p(x = 0) + p(z|ϕ, x = 1)p(x = 1)
=
1
2
[p(z|ϕ, x = 0) + p(z|ϕ, x = 1)] (15)
=
1
2
[
cos2
(
β − ϕ− pi
2
z
)
+ sin2
(
β − ϕ− pi
2
z
)]
=
1
2
,
where we have omitted the subindices ij . We have also
p(z) =
∑
ϕ′
p(z|ϕ′)p(ϕ′) = 2−n
∑
ϕ′
p(ϕ′) = 2−n. (16)
Therefore, we arrive at the following expression:
p(k|z) = p(ϕ|z) = p(ϕ) = p(k), (17)
which means that the a posteriori probability is equal to
the a priori one. In other words, Eve obtains no infor-
mation on the key if the knows only the results of her
measurement. This is due to the randomization intro-
duced by the random and yet unknown to Eve bits xi.
In fact, the quantum state of a qubit for unknown x is
the completely mixed state:
1
2
|ϕ〉 〈ϕ|+ 1
2
|ϕ+ pi
2
〉 〈ϕ+ pi
2
| = 1
2
I, (18)
where I is the identity operator.
Thus, on the stage of quantum state transmission, Eve
chooses the angle βij with no information on the key and
have to guess the bases or the initial key. Since it is
unlikely that she correctly guesses all bases, we arrive
at the keystone of the security of QKD: eavesdropping
cause disturbance. Rigorous estimations of the number
of bases that Eve can correctly guess is the main part of
security proof.
From the other side, we assume that, after the accom-
plishment of all stages of the protocol and, moreover,
after the transmission of the encrypted message, Eve is
able to determine the initial key. So, a posteriori, she gets
knowledge of the correct bases. In Appendix B we show
that Eve needs of order l bits to intercept to guess the
initial key if she knows the encrypted message (“known
plaintext attack”).
In our analysis, we assume that N and n are so large
that we can neglect the statistical fluctuations, since our
aim is to give general analysis of the protocol, not the
ultimate formulas for the practical applications.
A. BB84 with pseudorandom sequence of bases
For a transparent analysis, we first consider the pro-
tocol BB84 with pseudorandom bases. In this case, the
basis choice is specified by a single bit ai. Let the upper
bound on the number of bases correctly guessed by Eve
for a given γ be ncorrect(γ). Respectively, nincorrect(γ) =
n−ncorrect(γ) is the lower bound on the number of incor-
rect guesses. Recall that we assume that Eve eventually
gets knowledge of the initial key k, hence, for each po-
sition, she knows whether she has correctly guessed the
basis in this position or not. Consequently, the QBER
(q) and the Eve’s mean information on a raw key bit are
as follows:
q(γ) =
1
2
nincorrect(γ)
N
(19)
IE(γ) =
ncorrect(γ)
N
. (20)
The legitimate parties have the measured (or estimated)
value of QBER. If we replace the left-hand side of Eq. (19)
by this value, we can find the inverse function as follows:
γ = γ(q). (21)
This is an estimation of the fraction of qubits intercepted
by Eve for a given QBER. Then one has
IE(q) =
ncorrect(γ(q))
N
. (22)
From the other side, Bob’s mean information on a bit of
the Alice’s raw key is
IB(q) = 1− h(q). (23)
Here
h(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) (24)
5is the binary entropy, 0 ≤ h(p) ≤ 1. However, to fully
exploit this information, Alice and Bob require error-
correcting scheme that achieves the theoretical (Shan-
non) limit, in which h(q) bits of information about raw
keys are revealed over the public channel. Practically,
f(q)h(q) bits are revealed, where f(q) ≥ 1 is the effi-
ciency of the error correction scheme. So, the “effective”
Bob’s mean information on a bit of the Alice’s raw key is
IB(q) = 1− f(q)h(q). (25)
Then, the secret key rate (per transmitted qubit, also
called secret fraction) has the following form [9, 10, 52]:
R(q) = IB(q)− IE(q) = 1− f(q)h(q)− IE(q). (26)
Eve can try to guess the elements of the sequence {ai}
as it were a truly random sequence. In this case, she
correctly guesses approximately
ncorrect ≈ n
2
=
γN
2
(27)
of the bases. Thus,
q(γ) =
γ
4
, γ(q) = 4q, IE(q) = 2q, (28)
and the secret fraction is as follows:
R(q) = IB(q)− IE(q) = 1− f(q)h(q)− 2q. (29)
But Eve can exploit the fact that the sequence {ai} is
not random, but pseudorandom and contains some reg-
ularities. The estimation of ncorrect(γ) for this case is
rather involved and is given in Appendix C. Here we give
a summary of the analysis and results of Appendix C.
The analysis of pseudorandom sequences is an impor-
tant part of classical cryptography. But in classical cryp-
tography it is usually assumed that Eve has a limited
computing power and cannot use the brutal force attack.
Here we assume that Eve has an unlimited computing
power, which is common for quantum cryptography. Sup-
pose that Eve succeeded to guess a subset K1 ⊂ K which
contains the actual key k. Other words, it is unlikely that
she correctly guesses the key k for large l (the probability
is 1/|K| ∼ 2−l), but she can guess that k belongs to a cer-
tain subset K1. The probability of such success is equal
to |K1|/|K|. Then she can choose not arbitrary n = γN
positions to attack, but special positions. Namely, posi-
tions i such that the bits ai(k
′) coincide with each other
for most k′ ∈ K1 are preferable. Following this way of
thinking, we arrive at the optimization problem. If |K1|
is less or comparable to l, we are able to solve it explic-
itly. This is done in Theorem 1 and adopted for practical
situation in Corollary 1. In this case, we can use ex-
plicit formula (C15). If |K1| is large, then we can still
use formula (C15), but it gives too pessimistic (for Alice
and Bob) estimate of ncorrect(γ). A tighter bound can
be obtain if we numerically solve the linear programming
problem given in formula (C18) (Corollary 2). The lin-
ear programming problems are known to have efficient
algorithms of solutions.
Of course, ncorrect(γ) increase as |K1| decreases (Eve
adopt her attack to a tighter set of keys). However, the
probability that k ∈ K1 is |K1|/|K|, i.e., small whenever
|K1| is small. So, both estimates (C15) and (C18) are de-
pendent on the additional parameter ε = |K1|/|K|, i.e.,
ncorrect = ncorrect(γ, ε). The parameter ε can be called
the failure probability: the probability that Eve will suc-
ceed to guess a more tight set containing the actual key,
other words, that she will be more lucky than we expect.
The emergence of such (in)security parameter is common
for QKD security proofs [18].
In short, we use Eq. (C15) (explicit formula) or
Eq. (C18) (linear programming problem which gives a
tighter bound) to estimate ncorrect(γ, ε) from above for
given failure probability ε. These estimations can be sub-
stituted to Eq. (19) to find the function q(γ) and then to
Eq. (26) to obtain (numerically) the secret fraction.
It turns out that Eve can guess more elements of
pseudorandom sequence than those of truly random se-
quence (see the end of Appendix C). By this reason,
the BB84 protocol with pseudorandom sequence of bases
gives higher secret key rates than the usual BB84 pro-
tocol (because of the absence of sifting), but lower se-
cret key rates than the asymmetric BB84 protocol. So,
we do not consider the BB84 protocol with pseudoran-
dom sequence of bases as a real alternative to aBB84
and switch to the multibasis case. In the multibasis case,
the larger number of bases that Eve can correctly guess
for the pseudorandom sequence is compensated by ad-
ditional uncertainty for Eve caused by the use of many
(instead of two) bases. In Sec. III C, we will compare the
results of the multibasis PRB protocol with BB84 and
aBB84 and show that the multibasis protocol can give
slightly better results than the aBB84 protocol.
B. Multibasis case
Here we investigate the intercept-resend attack for the
multibasis version if the protocol. Denote the difference
between the Eve’s guess of the ith angle ϕEi and the ac-
tual angle ϕi(k) as ∆i and let (b
(1)
i , . . . , b
(m)
i ) be its binary
expansion:
∆i = ϕ
E
i − ϕi(k) =
pi
2
m∑
j=1
b
(j)
i 2
−j . (30)
For each register j, the upper bound of the number of
bits b
(j)
i correctly guessed by Eve is ncorrect(γ) given by
either Eq. (C15) or Eq. (C18) from Appendix C (i.e.,
now ncorrect(γ) denotes the number of correctly guessed
bits in a single register). Denote T ⊂ {1, . . . , N} the
set of pulses intercepted by Eve, |T | = n = γN . Let
us pick a position from T at random. For each regis-
ter, consider the event that the corresponding bit is cor-
6rectly guessed. The probability of this event is (at most)
ncorrect(γ)/(γN). Since the keys for different registers
are chosen independently, these events are independent.
Therefore, one has
Pr
[
∆i =
pit
2M
]
≡ pt(γ)
=
m−1∏
j=0
Pr
[
b
(j)
i = b2−jtc mod 2
]
=
(
ncorrect(γ,
ε
m )
γN
)#0(t)(
nincorrect(γ,
ε
m )
γN
)#1(t)
, (31)
where #0(t) and #1(t) are the numbers of 0’s and 1’s in
the binary expansion of t. Note the argument ε/m of the
function nincorrect: if the probability that Eve correctly
guesses more then a given number of bits in a single reg-
ister is not greater than ε/m, then the probability that
Eve correctly guesses more then a given number of bits
in each of m registers is not greater than ε.
Remark 3. For Eve, the correct guessing of the highest-
order bit b
(1)
i in the binary expansion (30) is of the most
importance. So, her optimal strategy is to chose positions
to intercept which maximize the number of correctly
guessed elements in the sequence for the first register
(b
(1)
1 , b
(1)
2 , . . .). The maximal number of correct guesses is
bounded from above as ncorrect(γ, ε). Since Eve adjusts
attack to optimize the number of correct guesses in the
first register, she is not so good in the number of cor-
rect guesses in further registers. But, in favor of Eve, we
bounded the number of correct guesses for other registers
from above also by the same quantity ncorrect(γ, ε).
Now let us derive formulas for QBER and Eve’s mean
information on a raw key bit. For simplicity, let us drop
the subscript i. Denote x ∈ {0, 1} the bit value transmit-
ted by Alice, y, z ∈ {0, 1} the results of Bob’s and Eve’s
measurements. We then have
p(z|x,∆) = cos2
(
∆ +
pi
2
(x− z)
)
, p(y|z,∆) = cos2
(
∆ +
pi
2
(z − y)
)
. (32)
p(y 6= x|∆) = p(y 6= x|z = x,∆)p(z = x|∆) + p(y 6= x|z 6= x,∆)p(z 6= x|∆) = 1
2
sin2(2∆) =
1
4
[1− cos(4∆)], (33)
p(y 6= x) =
M−1∑
j=0
pj(γ)p
(
y 6= x|∆ = pij
2M
)
=
1
4
M−1∑
j=0
pj(γ)
[
1− cos
(
2pij
M
)]
. (34)
where p(y 6= x) is the probability of error in Alice’s and
Bob’s bit for an intercepted position.
To obtain the QBER value, one has to multiply this
quantity on the fraction of intercepted positions:
q = γp(y 6= x) = γ
4
M−1∑
j=0
pj(γ)
[
1− cos
(
2pij
M
)]
. (35)
The Eve’s information on an intercepted raw key bit x is
as follows:
I interceptedE (γ) = 1−
M−1∑
j=0
pj(γ)h
(
cos2
(
pij
2M
))
(36)
The mean Eve’s information on a raw key bit then has
the following form:
IE(γ) = γI
intercepted
E (γ). (37)
From Eq. (35) we can find the inverse function γ(q),
which expresses the fraction of intercepted positions γ
dependent on the measured value of QBER q. Then we
have
IE(q) = γ(q)
1−M−1∑
j=0
pj(γ(q))h
(
cos2
(
pij
2M
)) .
(38)
To calculate the secret fraction, (38) should be substi-
tuted into (26).
It is useful to calculate the Eve’s information in case
N → ∞ (also l′ → ∞ since N = 2l′). In this case,
ncorrect(γ)/n = 1/2 (see the Remark 4 in Appendix C and
Eq. (A4) in Apendix A). Then we arrive at the following
expression:
q = γ
1
4
− 1
M
M−1∑
j=0
cos
(
2pij
M
) = γ
4
. (39)
The mean Eve’s information is then
IE(q)=4q
1− 1
M
M−1∑
j=0
h
(
cos2
(
pij
2M
)) ≡ 4qζ(M),
(40)
where ζ(M) is a decreasing function of M ,
lim
M→∞
ζ(M) ≈ 0.4427. (41)
The function ζ(M) is shown in Fig. 2. Since ζ(M) < 0.5
for M > 2, the multibasis version protocol has advantage
over the BB84 with pseudorandom sequence of bases.
Finally, we arrive at the following expression for the
secret fraction:
R = 1−f(q)h(q)−IE(q) = 1−f(q)h(q)−4qζ(M). (42)
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Figure 2. Function ζ(M).
C. Numerical comparison
We compare the secret key rates per bit of the raw
key (secret fractions) for the multibasis PRB protocol
(Eq. (26) and Eq. (38)) with those for the BB84 protocol
and the asymmetric BB84. The secret key rate per bit
of the raw key for the BB84 protocol is given by
R(q) =
1
2
[1− f(q)h(q)− 2q], (43)
where the factor 1/2 is due to sifting of a half of positions.
We consider the following variation of the asymmetric
BB84 protocol. For each pulse, Alice and Bob choose
independently the basis {|0〉 , |pi/2〉} (“the signal basis”)
with the probability 1 − p or the basis {|pi/4〉 , |3pi/4〉}
(“the test basis”) with the probability p. The first basis
is used to establish the secret key, while the second one
is used to detect the eavesdropping. The sifting rate is,
thus, on average, 1 − (1 − p)2. Alice and Bob announce
the bit values for positions encoded using the test basis
and calculate the QBER in the test basis q×. Also, after
the error correction step, they calculate the QBER in the
first basis q+ (see Sec. II, step (iv) of the protocol). We
consider the case of the absence of actual eavesdropping,
where the QBER is caused only by natural noise, then,
on average, q+ = q× = q.
The mean Eve’s information per bit of the sifted key is
2q. But now, for small p, we cannot neglect the statisti-
cal fluctuations. We can use, for example, the Hoeffding’s
inequality: if X is a binomially distributed random vari-
able with the probability of success P and the number of
trials K, then
Pr[X ≥ (P + δ)K] ≤ e−2δ2K = ε (44)
with ε being the failure probability (probability that Eve
is more lucky that we expect; its meaning is the same as
ε in the PRB protocol), or,
δ(P, ε) =
√
1
2K
ln
1
ε
. (45)
Here we have P = q, K = p2Nr (the mean number of
positions received by Bob for which both Alice and Bob
chose the test basis), where Nr ≤ N denotes the number
of pulses received by Bob (recall that N is the number of
pulses sent by Alice). Then
R(q) = (1− p)2
[
1− f(q)h(q)− 2
(
q +
√
1
2p2Nr
ln
1
ε
)]
.
(46)
So, a smaller p leads to lower sifting, but also to higher
statistical fluctuations of the potential Eve’s information
that we have to take into account. In the calculations we
optimized (46) over p for each value of q.
In the calculations, we use the following parameters:
L = N = 1010− 33, l′ = log2 L ≈ 16, m = 10 (M = 1024
bases). To obtain function γ(q) in (38), we have used for-
mula (C18) with the failure probability ε ≈ 10−6 (more
precisely, ε/m = S/L for S = 1000). The parameter
s in (C18) was set to s = 12. The number of pulses
sent by Alice for all protocols is equal to L. The num-
ber of pulses received by Bob is Nr = N if the quantum
channel is lossless. For a lossy channel we have taken a
realistic loss rate Nr/N = 0.001. The failure probabil-
ity for aBB84 in (46) was also taken as ε ≈ 10−6. The
results are given on Fig. 3.
It is clearly seen that the PRB protocol gives twice
as large secret fraction as the BB84 protocol (due to ab-
sence of sifting). In PRB, the larger number of bases that
Eve can correctly guess for the pseudorandom sequence
is compensated by additional uncertainty for Eve caused
by the use of many (instead of two) bases. This results
in approximately the same secret fractions for PRB and
asymmetric BB84 for the lossless channels. However, if
the channel is lossy, Alice and Bob have to increase p
and, hence, sifting rate, to collect large enough statistics
for the test basis. In this case we can see that PRB gives
slightly better results.
Note that the losses do not decrease the secret fraction
for the PRB protocol since the estimate of the number
of bases correctly guessed by Eve is dependent on L and
not on Nr. Moreover, if optimal positions to attack are
lost (see the end of Sec. III A for general comments on
the optimal Eve’s attack on the PRB protocol and Ap-
pendix C for rigorous analysis), the losses even weaken
Eve’s attack .
IV. PHOTON-NUMBER SPLITTING PLUS
QUANTUM STATES DISCRIMINATION
ATTACK
We performed the analysis for an ideal case, where the
light source is assumed to be single-photon. Practically,
usually weak coherent pulses are used [9, 10]. This gives
possibilities to Eve to perform additional attacks, for ex-
ample, photon number splitting (PNS) attack. In this
attack it is assumed that quantum technologies are fully
accessible for Eve. Let us describe this attack for the
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Figure 3. Secret key rates (per bit of the raw key, before
sifting) of the presented pseudorandom bases (PRB) protocol,
the BB84 protocol and the asymmetric BB84 (aBB84) pro-
tocol with and without losses in the quantum channel, when
the efficiency of error-correction achieves the theoretical limit
f = 1 (a) and for practically achievable efficiency f = 1.22
(b). It can be seen that the considered protocol gives better
secret key rates than the BB84 protocol and approximately
the same rates as the asymmetric BB84 protocol.
BB84 protocol. Eve measures the number of photons in
each pulse and, if the number of photons is at least two,
takes one photon and save it in her quantum memory.
After the announcement of the bases, she measures this
photon in the known basis and, so, obtains a bit of in-
formation about the raw keys without disturbance. This
potential Eve’s information must be taken into account
by Alice and Bob. Eve also can stop the single-photon
pulses to increase the fraction of the multiphoton pulses
(i.e., the number of pulses about which she can obtain
full information without disturbance). To detect such
actions, the so called decoy state method has been pro-
posed and developed [47–51]. Its purpose allows one to
obtain tight estimates on the number of single-photon
pulses and the number of errors in these pulses.
For the case of the proposed pseudorandom basis pro-
tocol, Eve can also perform the PNS attack. While in
BB84 she waits for the announcement of bases, here she
waits for the moment when she gets full knowledge of the
initial key and, hence, bases. To account for these attack,
Alice and Bob can also use the decoy state method.
But now Eve can perform another type of attack, which
we will refer to as “photon number splitting plus quan-
tum state discrimination” (PNS+QSD) attack. Namely,
Eve has a possibility to use multiphoton pulses to get
knowledge of the initial key during the transmission of
quantum states. Recall that all our analysis above was
based on the assumption that Eve has zero information
on the initial key during the transmission of quantum
states and has to guess the bases. But now she can per-
form the following variant of the PNS attack. Again, she
measures the number of photons in each pulse. If the
number of photons in a pulse is at least three, she sends
one photon to Bob (i.e., does not introduce disturbance)
and takes two photons to her quantum memory. We have
shown that a single photon without the knowledge of the
raw key bit leaks no information about the basis (see
Eqs. (17) and (18)). But this is not true if Eve has two
photons in the same state. Let us analyse this attack.
Suppose that Eve has intercepted n such double pho-
tons in positions i1, . . . , in. Then, to get knowledge of the
initial key x, she has to distinguish between 2l+n states
|ψ(k,x)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|ϕij (k) +
pi
2
xij 〉
⊗2
, (47)
where k ∈ {0, 1}l, x = {xi1 , . . . , xin} ∈ {0, 1}n.
Discrimination of quantum states (or hypothesis test-
ing) is a famous problem in quantum information sci-
ence [53]. We will use the following lower bound on the
success probability psucc of guessing the correct quantum
state (in our case – correct k and x) [54]:
psucc ≥ 1
2l+n
∑
k
∑
x
1∑
k′
∑
y 〈ψ(k,x)|ψ(k′,y)〉2
=
1
2l+n
∑
k
∑
x
1
1 +
∑
k′ 6=k
∑
y 〈ψ(k,x)|ψ(k′,y)〉2
,
∑
y
〈ψ(k,x)|ψ(k′,y)〉2
=
n∏
j=1
{
cos4[ϕij (k)− ϕij (k′)] + sin4[ϕij (k)− ϕij (k′)]
}
We restrict the analysis to the case of two bases (M = 2).
The analysis of the multibasis case leads to more cumber-
some calculations but qualitatively the same conclusions.
If k 6= k′, then approximately a half of basis choices for
the keys k and k′ coincide. Hence,∑
y
〈ψ(k,x)|ψ(k′,y)〉2 ≈ 2−n/2 (48)
and
psucc ≥ 1
1 + (2l − 1)2−n/2 , (49)
9i.e., Eve needs approximately 2l  N three-photon
pulses to guess the secret key k with a non-negligible
probability. Then she can measure the pulses in correct
bases without disturbance. Hence, the protocol crucially
requires single-photon sources.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the present work, we have analyzed a new prepare-
and-measure QKD protocol. It uses the pseudorandom
sequence of bases generated by the legitimate parties of
communications from a common initial secret key (seed).
The use of a common pseudorandom sequence of bases
allows one to avoid the sifting procedure and, hence, los-
ing the half of the key. Moreover, since the bases of Alice
and Bob are always the same, they can use more than
two bases.
The main result of this work is the calculation of the
secret key rates of the new protocol for the intercept-
resend attack presented on Fig. 3. The main technical
ingredient is Appendix C, where the mathematical tools
of analysis of pseudorandom sequences in the context of
quantum cryptography (where the adversary has unlim-
ited computing power) are proposed. The main practical
formulas derived in this appendix are (C15) and (C18).
They give upper bound on the elements of a pseudoran-
dom sequence that can be correctly guessed by the eaves-
dropper with unlimited computing power.
We have obtained that, for single-photon sources, the
new protocol gives twice as large secret key rates as the
original BB84 protocol and in some cases gives slightly
higher rates than the aBB84 protocol. However, we did
some assumptions in favor of Eve (see, for example, Re-
mark 3). More tight analysis, which requires the devel-
opment of techniques of Appendix C, probably, will lead
to even more significant advantage of the proposed pseu-
dorandom multibasis protocol. The protocol strongly re-
quires a single-photon source of light.
The mathematical tools developed in Appendix C can
be used in different problems of quantum cryptogra-
phy, for example, for rigorous estimation of how the
use of pseudorandom sequences (instead of truly random
ones) influence the security of the conventional prepare-
and-measure QKD protocols, such as BB84, asymmetric
BB84, etc. First steps in such analysis have been done
in Ref. [38]. The novelty of our approach is the sugges-
tion that the pseudorandomness can be even turned to
an advantage.
In general, future investigations of the power of clas-
sical pseudorandomness combined with quantum uncer-
tainty in quantum cryptography are required. The fun-
damental difference with the consideration of pseudoran-
dom sequences in conventional cryptography is that, in
the latter case, one typically assumes the boundedness of
the eavesdropper’s computing power. For example, it is
assumed that the eavesdropper cannot use the brute force
attack to try all possible seeds for a PRNG. In contrast, in
quantum cryptography we assume unlimited computing
power of the eavesdropper. But, from the other side, the
possibilities of the eavesdropper are limited by the quan-
tum uncertainty principle. Thus, the analysis of quantum
pseudorandom sequences may require novel mathemati-
cal methods.
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APPENDIX A. PSEUDORANDOMNESS
PROPERTY OF THE LEGENDRE SEQUENCES
Here we formulate the keystone pseudorandomness
property of the Legendre sequences which is exploited
in the present analysis – mainly, in Appendix C. Note
that
ai+L = ai, (A1)
i.e., {ai} is a periodic sequence. We then denote ZL =
{0, . . . , L − 1} the residue ring with respect to integer
addition and multiplication modulo L. For distinct el-
ements i1, . . . , is ∈ ZL and binary b1, . . . , bs, denote
di1,i2,...,is(b1, b2, . . . , bs) the number of j ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}
such that
aj+i1 = b1, aj+i2 = b2, . . . aj+is = bs, (A2)
i.e., the number of occurrences of the pattern
∗ . . . ∗ b1 ∗ . . . ∗ b2 ∗ . . . ∗ . . . ∗ bs (A3)
in one period. Here ∗ are “do-not-care” bits. In other
words, we look for patterns with the bit values b1, . . . , bs
on positions i1, . . . , is. Here we do not care bit values on
other positions.
We will use the following bounds [43–45]: for all dis-
tinct i1, . . . , is ∈ ZP and all binary b1, . . . , bs:
di,j(b1, b2) =
{
(L− 3)/4, (b1, b2) = (1, 1)
(L+ 1)/4, (b1, b2) 6= (1, 1), (A4a)
−W (s) ≤ di1,i2,...,is(b1, b2, . . . , bs)−
L
2s
≤W (s) (A4b)
for s ≥ 3, where
W (s) =
√
L[2s−1(s− 3) + 2] + 2s−1(s+ 1)− 1
2s
. (A4c)
For large s, W can be approximated as
√
L[(s− 3)/2] +
(s+ 1)/2.
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APPENDIX B. GUESSING THE SEED FOR
PRNG
In our analysis we assumed that, after all stages of
the protocol and after the transmission of a message
encrypted with the use of the distributed key, Eve can
correctly guesses the initial secret key (the seed for the
PRNG). In this Appendix, we derive bounds on the num-
ber of qubits that Eve needs to intercept for correct guess-
ing of the seed. We show that this assumption is not too
pessimistic.
Firstly, we specify assumptions on Eve’s knowledge. Of
course, Eve knows her measurement results of intercepted
qubits zi1 , . . . , zin . We further assume that, during the
stage of error correction, Eve discovers (along with a syn-
drome or other messages sent via error correction) the
positions where she introduces errors and the values of
the bits xi and yi in such positions. This is indeed true
if the Cascade protocol for error correction is used, but
may be too pessimistic in the case of the use of one-way
error-correcting codes (for example, LDPC codes). Let
us also denote ci = xi ⊕ yi.
Moreover, we assume that Eve may know a part of the
message encoded with the key distributed by the proto-
col (“known plaintext attack”). Let r bits of the secret
key (u1, . . . , ur) are distributed; r < N due to the key
contraction in the privacy amplification stage. The last l
bits from this key are kept for the next session as a new
initial key. The first r − l bits are used for encryption
of a message, for example, using one-time pad encryp-
tion. Eve may know a part of this message (or even the
whole message) and, hence, the corresponding bits of the
key (u1, . . . , uq), q ≤ r− l. She can use this knowledge as
well as her results of quantum measurements to guess the
unknown part of the distributed key and, in particular,
the initial key for the next session. The knowledge of the
initial key for the next session gives her a possibility to
obtain the key of the next session without introducing
errors, since she can also construct the sequence {ϕi(k)}
in the next session.
For definiteness, let us assume that Bob is the side that
correct errors, so that after error correction Alice and
Bob have the common key x1, . . . , xN . If the Toeplitz
hashing is used for privacy amplification, then ui are lin-
ear combinations (with respect to XOR) of xj :
ui =
N∑
j=1
tijxj , i = 1, . . . , r, (B1)
where tij are the elements of a Toeplitz matrix.
Thus, Eve knows:
(i) her measurement results zi1 , . . . , zin ;
(ii) the syndrome of the used error-correcting code (or
parities of certain subsets of positions if an inter-
active error-correcting procedure like “Cascade” is
used);
(iii) whether she has introduced errors in the intercepted
positions: ci1 , . . . , cin . Also she knows xij and yij if
cij = 1;
(iv) q ≤ r − l outputs of linear combinations (B1).
For convenience of notations, let Eve attacks the first
r transmitted state and ij = j. Also, to make the deriva-
tions simpler, we do the following modification of the
protocol: let the angles ϕi(k) in (3) are chosen from
the set { pij2M }2M−1j=0 rather than from { pij2M }M−1j=0 , M ≥ 2.
Thus, we add an additional pseudorandom binary regis-
ter which is responsible for an additional rotation of the
angle over pi/2. This does not alter the security proper-
ties of the protocol (if the initial key is also added by one
bit) since a basis rotated over pi/2 is in fact the same ba-
sis as the initial one up to the interchange of the assigned
bit values 0 and 1. However, as we noted before, the bit
value is supposed to be known to Eve after the trans-
mission of an encrypted message. Such a modification is
useless for practice since we should spend the initial se-
cret key on the additional register, but it is useful for the
purposes of the present section: this modification makes
the situation more symmetric and simplifies the analysis.
Thus, in expansion (10), we have an additional register:
ϕi(k) =
pi
2
m∑
j=0
ai(k
(j))2−j . (B2)
Now we are going to estimate the probability of guessing the seed
pguess = max
k
p(k|e1, ..., en), (B3)
where ei = (xi, zi, ci) is Eve’s knowledge on the i-th transmitted quantum state.
Then we have
p(k|e1, ..., en) = p(e1, ..., en|k)p(k)
p(e1, ..., en)
= 2−l
p(e1|ϕ1(k)) · · · p(en|ϕr(k))
p(e1, ..., en)
. (B4)
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Let us find an expression for p(ei|ϕi):
p(ei|ϕi) = p(xi|ϕi)p(zi|ϕi, xi)p(ci|ϕi, xi, zi) = 1
2
p(zi|ϕi, xi)p(ci|ϕi, xi, zi)
=
1
2
cos2
[
βi − ϕi + pi
2
(zi − xi)
]
cos2
[
βi − ϕi + pi
2
(zi − xi − ci)
]
=
1
8
{
cos
pici
2
+ cos
[
2(βi − ϕi) + pi(xi − zi)− pici
2
]}2
=
1
8
{
1− ci + cos
[
2(βi − ϕi) + pi(xi − zi)− pici
2
]}2
.
(B5)
Here we have used that cos pix2 = 1− x if x ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, we arrive at the following expressions:
p(ei) =
1
M
M−1∑
j=0
p
(
ei|ϕi = pij
M
)
=
{
3/16, ci = 0,
1/16, ci = 1,
p(ci) =
∑
xi,zi∈{0,1}
p(ei) =
{
3/4, ci = 0,
1/4, ci = 1.
(B6)
Substitution of Eq. (B5) into Eq. (B4) yields
p(k|e1, ..., en) = 2
−l
p(e1, ..., en)
n∏
i=1
1
8
{
1− ci + cos
[
2(βi − ϕi) + pi(xi − zi)− pici
2
]}2
(B7)
If n ≤ l′ (recall that l′ is the length of the initial key for each register, while l = ml′ is the whole length of the
initial key), then ϕi are approximately independent and uniformly distributed on their domain. Hence, Eve’s variables
e1, . . . , en are also approximately independent: p(e1, ..., en) ≈ p(e1) · · · p(en). By properties of the Legendre sequences,
for every combination of angles ϕi, there exists a key k generating this combination. Then the maximization of Eq. (B7)
is equivalent to maximization of every separate term in the product in its right-hand side, i.e., maximization of (B5).
Let us maximize (B5) over ϕi. We have
max
ϕi
p(ei|ϕi) =

p(ei|βi) = 1/2, ci = 0, zi = xi,
p(ei|βi + pi/2) = 1/2, ci = 0, zi 6= xi,
p(ei|βi + pi/4) = 1/8, ci = 1.
(B8)
Other words, if Eve has not introduced an error and her measurement result zi has coincided with xi, then her optimal
guess is that Alice has chosen the same basis as Eve: ϕi = βi. If Eve has not introduce an error, but her measurement
result zi has not coincided with xi, then her optimal guess is ϕi = βi + pi/2, i.e., Alice has chosen the basis different
from the Eve’s basis by pi/2: the basis rotated by pi/2 coincides with the initial basis up to a bit flip. Finally, if Eve
has introduced an error, then her optimal guess is ϕi = βi+pi/4, which corresponds to a situation that yields an error
with the maximal probability (1/2).
Putting it all together, we arrive at the following expression:
max
k
p(k|e1, . . . , en) = 2−l
(
8
3
)n0
2n1 = 2−l+n0 log
8
3+n1 = 2−l+3n0+n1−n0 log 3, (B9)
where n0 and n1 are number of positions where ci = 0 and ci = 1 respectively. Indeed, n0 + n1 = n. Since
p(ci = 0) = 3/4 and p(ci = 1) = 1/4, if n is large, then n0 ≈ 3n/4, n1 = n/4. Then
max
k
p(k|e1, . . . , en) ≈ 2−l+n[ 34 log 83+ 14 ] = 2−l+n[ 52−
3 log 3
4 ] ≈ 2−l+1.3n. (B10)
Recall that this derivation is valid if n ≤ l′. But we are
interested in the inverse case. Then the analysis is more
complicated. Firstly, not every sequence of angles {ϕi}
is possible: different angles are not independent, hence,
maximization of the numerator in (B7) is not reduced to
maximization its separate factors. Secondly, e1, . . . , en
are also not independent (as the measurement results of
dependent quantum states).
Nevertheless, we will still use formula (B9) as an upper
bound for the guessing probability. The arguments are
as follows. The most advantageous situation for Eve is
when the current angle ϕi does not depend on the previ-
ous angles. In this case, the measurement gives Eve more
information than the measurement in the case when Eve
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already has partial information on ϕi. Thus, in favour
of Eve, we treat ϕi independent from each other even
if r > l′ and use formulas (B9) and (B10). Numerical
experiments confirm that the validity of these formulas
as upper bounds. Then Eve can guess a key in approxi-
mately (lower bound):
n =
l
5
2 − 3 log 34
≈ 0.76 l. (B11)
Thus, Eve needs of order l intercepted positions to cor-
rectly guess the initial secret key. Our numerical exper-
iments with short enough keys (up to l′ = 10, which
allows one to explicitly implement the proposed maxi-
mum likelihood method) and m ≤ 8 show that formula
(B11) is adequate as a rough estimate at least for the
subkeys k(0) and k(1) that govern the highest-order (i.e.,
most important) bits in the binary expansion of angles
(B2). One needs much more iterations to correctly guess
the lowest-order bits since close quantum states are hard
to distinguish. From the other side, lowest-order regis-
ters are less important. Hence, the assumption that Eve
gets a knowledge of the initial key after the transmission
of the ciphertext (provided that she knows the plaintext)
seems to be not too pessimistic.
APPENDIX C. GUESSING IN
PSEUDO-RANDOM BINARY SEQUENCES
In this Appendix we obtain an upper bound for the
number of correctly guessed bits in a certain class of bi-
nary pseudo-random sequences. We assume that Eve has
access to unlimited computing power, and we design an
optimal attack for Eve.
Let us introduce assumptions about PRNG. Let {ai(k)}∞i=1 be a periodic sequence with the period L for any k, i.e.,
ai+L(k) = ai(k). The set of keys is K = ZL = {0, . . . , L − 1}, the residue ring with respect to integer addition and
multiplication modulo L. For distinct keys k1, . . . , ks and binary b1, . . . , bs, denote
Ab1...bs(k1, . . . , ks) = {i ∈ ZL| ai(k1) = b1, . . . , ai(ks) = bs}. (C1)
Let us assume that there exists S ≥ 2 such that, for all distinct keys k1, . . . , kS and for all binary b1, . . . , bS ,
|Ab1,...,bs(k1, . . . , ks)| =
L
2S
. (C2)
It is also assumed that L is divided by 2S .
Eve chooses the fraction 0 < γ ≤ 1 of positions that she will try to guess, i.e., she will try to guess γL positions in
a period. Her aim is to choose the positions to maximize the fraction of the guessed outcomes. If Eve attacks all L
positions, then, due to Eq. (C2), she guesses exactly a half of positions, which is expected when the sequence is truly
random. We are going to prove the upper bound for the case 0 < γ < 1.
Theorem 1. Let the pattern distribution satisfy (C2) and we try to guess n = γL positions in a period. Then the
number of correctly guessed bits does not exceed
ncorrect(γ) = L
{
Ps−1(r) +
s− r − 1
s
(γ − 2Ps(r))
}
(C3)
with the probability at least 1 − s/|K|, for every 2 ≤ s ≤ S. Here Ps(t) = Pr[Xs ≤ t], where Xs is a binomially
distributed random variable with the number of experiments s and the success probability in one experiment 1/2 (i.e.,
Ps(t) is a cumulative distribution function), and r is the integer such that Ps(r) ≤ γ/2 but Ps(r + 1) > γ/2.
Proof. Let us consider s arbitrary distinct keys k1, . . . , ks. Let T ⊂ ZL be the set of positions chosen by Eve, |T | = γL.
Denote nb1...bs = |Ab1...bs(k1, . . . , ks) ∩ T |.
Let it be known that the actual key k is one of the keys k1, . . . , ks. Let n
(i)
correct is the number of our correct guesses
provided that the actual key is ki, i = 0, . . . , s− 1. We try to maximize min(n(1)correct, . . . , n(s)correct), i.e., the guaranteed
number of correct guesses.
Let the set T be fixed. For each position j ∈ T , if the majority of the values aj(k1), . . . , aj(ks) is 0 (1), then the
optimal guess aguessj is also equal to 0 (1), i.e.,
aguessj =
{
0, HW(aj(k1), . . . , aj(ks)) ≤ s/2,
1, otherwise,
(C4)
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where HW(b1, . . . , bs) is the Hamming weight of the vector (b1, . . . , bs). Then
n
(i)
correct =
∑
(b1,...,bs):
HW(b1,...,bs)≤s/2,
bi=0
nb1...bs +
∑
(b1,...,bs):
HW(b1,...,bs)>s/2,
bi=1
nb1...bs (C5)
for i = 1, . . . , s.
Thus, we have the following optimization problem with respect to 2s integers nb1...bs :
min(n
(1)
correct, . . . , n
(s)
correct)→ max,∑
(b1,...,bs)
nb1...bs = γL,
nb1...bs ≤ 2−sL, ∀(b1, . . . , bs),
(C6)
where the last condition is a consequence of (C2). From the symmetry of the problem we can put
nb1...bs = nHW(b1,...,bs) (C7)
(that is, only the number of keys ki such that aj(ki) = a
guess
j for a certain position j matters). So, n
(1)
correct = . . . =
n
(s)
correct = ncorrect. Denote also νt = nt/L and νcorrect = ncorrect/L.
The number of vectors (b1, . . . , bs) with the Hamming weight t is equal to
(
s
t
)
(a binomial coefficient). If we have
a constraint bi = 1 for fixed i (like in the summation in (C5)), then the number of vectors with the Hamming weight
t is equal to
(
s− 1
t− 1
)
. If we have a constraint bi = 0 for fixed i, then the number of vectors with the Hamming weight
t is equal to
(
s− 1
t
)
. Thus,
νcorrect =
bs/2c∑
t=0
(
s− 1
t
)
νt +
s∑
t=bs/2c+1
(
s− 1
t− 1
)
νt, (C8)
and the optimization problem (C6) is reduced to
νcorrect =
bs/2c∑
t=0
(
s− 1
t
)
νt +
s∑
t=bs/2c+1
(
s− 1
t− 1
)
νt → max,
s∑
t=0
(
s
t
)
νt = γ,
νt ≤ 2−s, t = 0, . . . , s.
(C9)
Obviously, an optimal choice is to assign the maximally possible value 2−s to νt with t close to 0 or s. This means
that we prefer positions where the guessed value is true for large number of keys. Other words, we primarily try to
maximize ν0 and νs, then try to maximize ν1 and νs−1, and so on. The restriction of this process is the first constraint
in (C9). Denote r the minimal integer such that
r∑
t=0
(
s
t
)
2−s =
s∑
t=s−r
(
s
t
)
2−s ≤ γ
2
, but (C10)
r+1∑
t=0
(
s
t
)
2−s =
s∑
t=s−r−1
(
s
t
)
2−s >
γ
2
. (C11)
Eqs. (C10) and (C11) can be rewritten as Ps(r) ≤ γ/2 and Ps(r + 1) > γ/2.
Thus, νt are set to maximally possible value 2
−s for t ≤ r and t ≥ s − r. Then, νr+1 and νs−r−1 are assigned by
as larger value as possible:
νr+1 = νs−r−1 =
(γ
2
− Ps(r)
)(
s
r + 1
)−1
. (C12)
14
Other νt (i.e., for r + 2 < t < s− r − 2) are set to zero. The optimal value of the target function νcorrect is
νcorrect =
r∑
t=0
(
s− 1
t
)
2−s +
(
s− 1
r + 1
)(
s
r + 1
)−1 (γ
2
− Ps(r)
)
+
s∑
t=s−r
(
s− 1
t− 1
)
2−s +
(
s− 1
s− r − 1
)(
s− r − 1
r + 1
)−1 (γ
2
− Ps(s− r)
)
= Ps−1(r) +
s− r − 1
s
(γ − 2Ps(r)).
(C13)
This result means that, for any s keys, we cannot choose γL positions such that more than ncorrect guesses given
by formula (C3) are correct for all keys. This means that the number of correct guesses cannot be larger than ncorrect
with the probability at least 1− s/|K|.
Remark 4. If, in (C3), s→∞, then, by definition of r, we have Ps(r)→ γ/2 and Ps−1(r)→ γ/2, so, ncorrect → Lγ/2.
Recall that Lγ is the number of terms we try to guess, i.e., the fraction of correct guesses tends to a 1/2, as in the
case of truly random sequences.
Now let us relax condition (C2).
Corollary 1. Let the pattern distribution satisfy
|Ab1,...,bs(k1, . . . , ks)| =
L
2s
+W (s) (C14)
for all s from some range, where W (s) is some function. We try to guess n = γL positions in a period. Then, with
the probability at least 1− ε, the number of correctly guess bits does not exceed
ncorrect(γ, ε) = L
′
{
Ps−1(r) +
s− r − 1
s
(γ′ − 2Ps(r))
}
, (C15)
where s = ε|K|. Here
L′ = L′(s) = L
(
1 +
2sW (s)
L
)
, γ′ = γ′(s) = γ
(
1 +
2sW (s)
L
)−1
, (C16)
and r is the integer such that Ps(r) ≤ γ′/2 but Ps(r + 1) > γ′/2.
Note that, for the PRNG based on the Legendre symbol, (C14) is satisfied due to (A4) and (8).
Proof. The proof is the same, but optimization problem (C6) is modified into
min(n
(1)
correct, . . . , n
(s)
correct)→ max,∑
(b1,...,bs)
nb1...bs = γL = γ
′L′,
nb1...bs ≤ 2−sL+W (s) = 2−sL′, ∀(b1, . . . , bs).
(C17)
So, formula (C15) holds with the substitutions of L and γ by L′ and γ′.
If s > dLe = l, formulas (C3) and (C15) may be too optimistic for Eve. But we can obtain more tight bounds.
Corollary 2. Let (C14) be satisfied for some s. Other conditions are as in Corollary 1. Then, with the probability
at least 1− ε, the number of correctly guess bits does not exceed
ncorrect(γ, ε) = ν
∗
correctL
′. (C18)
Here ν∗correct is the solution of the following linear programming problem for S = ε|K|:
νcorrect =
bS/2c∑
t=0
(
S − 1
t
)
νt +
S−1∑
t=bS/2c+1
(
S − 1
t− 1
)
νt → max
S∑
t=0
(
S
t
)
νt = γ
′
S−s∑
t=0
(
S − s
t
)
νh+t ≤ 2−s, h = 0, . . . , s,
(C19)
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with the agreement νt = νS−t, i.e., the actual number of variables in the optimization problem is b(S + 1)/2c.
Proof. Let us consider S arbitrary keys k1, . . . , kS , but condition (C14) is satisfied for s ≤ S. A generalization of
optimization problem (C17) to this case is
min(n
(1)
correct, . . . , n
(s)
correct)→ max,∑
(b1,...,bS)
nb1...bS = γ
′L′,
∑
(b1,...,bS):
bi1=c1,...,bis=cs
nb1...bS ≤ 2−sL′, ∀(c1, . . . , cs), 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < is ≤ S,
(C20)
where
n
(i)
correct =
∑
(b1,...,bS):
HW(b1,...,bS)≤S/2,
bi=0
nb1...bS +
∑
(b1,...,bS):
HW(b1,...,bS)>S/2,
bi=1
nb1...bS (C21)
Again, by the symmetry, we can put
nb1...bS = nHW(b1,...,bS) (C22)
and nt = nS−t, so, the problem is reduced to (C19) (where νt = nt/L′ and νcorrect = ncorrect/L′). Let us comment
the last set of constraints. If HW(c1, . . . , cs) = h, then the left-hand side of the last constraint in (C20) is reduced to
h+S−s∑
t=h
(
S − s
t− h
)
νt =
S−s∑
t=0
(
S − s
t
)
νh+t, (C23)
which coincides with that of (C19).
Remark 5. The parameter s in (C19) is, in fact, an op-
timization parameter. If we use the Legendre sequences
as PRNG, then, according to (A4), s should be taken be-
tween
√
l and l: smaller s leads to less tight bounds, while
larger s lead to large deviations W (s) in (A4), which also
lead to less tight bounds.
The comparison of the results of formulas (C15) and
(C18) for Legendre sequences (see Sec. II A and Ap-
pendix A) is given on Fig. 4. We took L = 1010 − 33,
log2 L ≈ 16, s = 12 (for both (C15) and (C18)), and
S = 1000, ε = S/L ≈ 10−7. We calculate the quantity
δ(γ) = νcorrect(γ)−1/2, i.e., deviation of νcorrect from the
mean value 1/2 in the case of random guessing.
It is clearly seen that the results of (C18) are signif-
icantly better. We however note that the estimate for
truly random sequences given by the Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity (45) for P = 1/2, K = n, and ε = 10−7 yields
δ ≈ 2.8 × 10−4 = 0.028% even for n = 0.01N (i.e.,
γ = 0.01 = 1%). Thus, from the cryptanalyst’s point
of view (if it has enough computing power), an opti-
mal guesses of elements of pseudorandom sequences gives
much better results than the simple random guessing.
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